Of course, general statements of the law are not inherently incapable of giving fair and clear warning to officers, but in the light of pre-existing law the unlawfulness must be apparent, A courtroom marshal was not entitled to absolute immunity on excessive force claims by two bail enforcement agents removed from a court room at a judge's request. The pursued man twice called police dispatch, claiming that he had a gun and threatening to shoot the officers. Firing a total of 15 shots during the 10-second span was reasonable when the driver never abandoned his attempt to flee. Instead, the appeals court improperly resolved disputed issues concerning the lighting present, the demeanor of the plaintiff's mother, the plaintiff's positioning during the shooting, and whether he had shouted a direct threat, in favor of the officer, the moving party on the summary judgment motion. The officers were found not guilty of charges arising from the incident and sued those involved in the investigation and prosecution.
He was not performing a judicial function, and allegedly used force in excess of what the judge commanded and the Constitution allows. The dispatcher broadcast these threats and the possibility that the motorist might be intoxicated. While ordinarily, a trial court order denying summary judgment is not a final decision and therefore not immediately appealable, a denial based on a qualified immunity claim can be immediately appealed, and therefore the federal appeals court had jurisdiction to hear the appeal, but erroneously did not grant the officers qualified immunity. Two prosecutors were entitled to both absolute and qualified immunity for their roles.
A former prisoner in an Ohio facility claimed that a correctional officer had sexually assaulted her on two consecutive nights, and sued two superintending prison officers, a case manager on her living unit, and a prison investigator. This statute had never been repealed, was still on the books, and had even recently been revised, but had been declared unconstitutional by the highest court in New York eighteen years before. The court rejected, however, the officer's argument that he was entitled to qualified immunity for banning the plaintiff in this fashion from all city recreational facilities, as there was definitely a protected liberty interest in being able to remain in a public place. The officer claimed that he felt trapped by the crashed car and unable to safely retreat, as well as threatened by the husband. The court did, however, grant the mayor qualified immunity on the plaintiffs' substantive due process claims because of his lack of sufficiently direct personal involvement in the killings, applying the analysis adopted by the U.
A federal appeals court ruled that a police officer was entitled to qualified immunity from liability for arresting the plaintiff for violation of a state statute that prohibited loitering in a public place for the purpose of soliciting another person to engage in deviate sexual behavior. Even if the plaintiff had a property interest in his $10 pool token, the appeals court commented, that interest was minimal, and insufficient to raise a due process claim. As the husband came towards him, he charged holding two golf clubs over his head, and the officer fired three times, killing him. The appeals court, relying on caselaw from other federal circuit courts of appeal, rejected the argument that the law on the subject was not clearly established.
He sued the police for alleged failure to disclose potentially exculpatory evidence to his defense. Factual issues concerning whether the woman actually tried to hit the officer, and whether he actually used the pepper spray had to be resolved, precluding the appeals court from upholding the officer's immunity defense.